The Suez Crisis: Annotated Bibliography of Three Selected Texts
| | RISQ Reviews | 28 June 2003 |
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Author: E.K. Bensah
'Nasser's move in seizing the canal in 1956 was not wilful or ill-considered; on the contrary he had not only harboured the idea for some time but worked out both what he expected others to do and the line to be adopted by Egypt'
(Peter Woodward, 1992)
Stanley Meisler, A United Nations History, A Fifty Years History
After reading Stanley Meisler's article on the Suez crisis, it would be hard for one not to be intrigued by the events and protagonists. Looking at the back of the book, the author acknowledges basing much of the details of his account of the crisis on what he considers the British journalist Keith Kyles' "exhaustive" account of the so-called conspiracy.
Moreover, conspiracy the crisis was too. Meisler intimates that events leading up to the Franco-British collusion at the Protocol de Sevres was everything but openly agreed to. Woodrow Wilson, brainchild of the League of Nations, would have turned in his grave had he been alive to witness the duplicitous activities of these powers in question. Furthermore, he would have rebuked their policies for being anathema to the late President's call for open covenants openly arrived at.
That said, there is nothing new about Great Powers colluding to make decisions in their interest post-League of Nations era. The Italo-Ethiopian crisis of October 1936, which secured the definitive demise of the moribund organization was made possible principally by the prevarication and equivocation of the then respective governments of Britain and France, with as Foreign Secretaries, Sir Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval. They were to ultimately opt for economic and political expediency at the expense of the incipient desire to create world peace.
With respect to this crisis in question, it is important to note that the author, while American, appears to be objective in the face of overwhelming evidence that indicates a greater US role in bringing closure to the crisis.
In this particular chapter on the Suez crisis, Meisler opens the section with October 30 1956 - merely six days after the arrangement was made by the duplicitous three -- Israel, Britain and France - at the so-called Protocol de Sèvres. The author subsequently introduces the essential characters progressively: Henry Cabot Lodge; US President Eisenhower; Hammarskjold; Eden; Pineau…and finally Egyptian President Nasser.
Meisler indicates the significance of the crisis by describing it to be "the moment in the twentieth century…defin{ing} the end of traditional imperialism"(95). He argues that "the crisis exposed the British and the French, masters of the two greatest empires in the world, as impotent blusterers…"(ibid.)
Whilst this may appear to be too harsh a critique considering it was the American government that effectively ended the "depth of the perfidy of the British and French"(94), the British authors of the book The Suez Crisis by Gorst and Johnmann, equally apportion blame to their government.
Perhaps one of the factors that make the analysis of the crisis so compelling is the fact that the British, French and Israelis were so blatant in their collusion and action. Equally significant is how like thieves at a heist, they split and slinked away as soon as the police officers - the UN and US arrived.
In fact, crucial to the understanding of the crisis is the role of Nasser, and how the Western world perceived him. Given that the author is American, I was expecting a rather slanderous, or negative, account, but instead, Meisler describes him thus: "Nasser clearly envisioned himself as the force that would help unite the Arab world under Egyptian leadership."(97)
Meisler actually does a good job in his portrayal of the hawkish US lawyer, Dulles, who it seemed, was hell-bent on frustrating Nasser's attempt to dislocate what I would regard his "economic shoulder" -- the Suez Canal - from the West. It is also here that Meisler's objectivity comes out, when he describes the extent to which Dulles sought to preserve US interests by tempting Nasser into maintaining a dependency on the West. We see this exemplified by his encouragement of then World Bank President Eugene Black to support Nasser's vision of the Aswan Dam: "Dulles saw this at first as insurance that Nasser would not slip into the Soviet camp."
Woodward, Peter. Profiles in Power: Nasser. Longman Group Limited U.K. 1992. pp.49-54.
This article, as its title suggests, is a case study rather than a qualitative or quantitative one. That the author writes about Nasser's life both before and after Suez, it is clear from the writing that the Suez crisis played a pivotal role and, to an extent informed Nasser's political career.
In the conclusion to the book, Woodward actually ascribes Nasser's success at Suez not necessarily because of his strength of leadership but rather because of the vulnerable position in which the international system found itself. "In retrospect" he writes, "it looks as if {Nasser} rode a wave, but as with other Third World nationalist leaders, it was a wave that owed much to the work of its leaders, whether as coup-makers or nationalist party creators"(156).
In fact, I would argue that the author predicates his hypothesis on the idea that "the decay of the European empires was mirrored in the decline of their traditional collaborators"(ibid.). Consequently, it left the "whole structure vulnerable", and it is this that he argues "Nasser capitalised on, both in Egypt and the Middle East"(156).
In any event, the British author of this article is particularly objective, considering the way Nasser is often vilified by Western writers over his sudden nationalization of the Suez Canal. Reading about it in other sources, one would have us believe that Nasser was this highly nationalistic demagogue whose moral dipstick was a two drops short of bone dry. This, however, is not the way Woodward portrays him.
The language that he uses is as clear as it is concise. For example, in describing Nasser's expectations of how the British would react, he writes that Nasser "clearly expected Britain and France to huff and puff"(49); in other words, he knew they would make a fuss, fret and fume.
Crucial to any work is undoubtedly the perception of the author. The trap that most historians often fall into when writing about an event is judging the past from tinted glasses; hindsight becomes 20/20. Fortunately, many a published historian actually eschews this method, and Woodward is one of them.
For example, he describes how from the outset, it was almost impossible for Nasser to have foreseen what the ramifications of the joint power's collusion would be. He almost goes outright in what seems like a defence of Nasser: "Nasser's move in seizing the canal was not wilful or ill-considered; on the contrary he had not only harboured the idea for some time but worked out both what he expected others to do and the line to be adopted by Egypt" (ibid.). He also describes the frantic efforts made by Britain and France to show Egypt's inability to operate the Suez Canal thus: "…much was being made by Britain and France of Egypt's alleged inadequacy to operate it herself"(ibid.).
When I first read this, I found it amazing that a historian would use the word "alleged" to describe the perception of a particular country, when other sources, categorically state and sententiously argue who was responsible. Put simply, Woodward's work is thus far a breath of fresh air over other writings on Nasser and the crisis.
The author lends credence to his argument of Egypt's so-called "alleged inadequacy" by arguing that one of the ways in which the misperception of Nasser was made to continue was through "identifying Nasser as the sinister personality behind the move, and pointing to the danger of an individual dictator having a finger on one of the most vital arteries of international trade"(50).
That Nasser was actually compared to Hitler by British Prime Minister Eden is as overwhelming as it is understandable, for Eden had been a vociferous opponent of Chamberlain's policy of appeasement in 1938, and probably (erroneously) perceived history to be repeating itself.
Woodward lends weight to this idea when he writes how "…the reverse {Eden's changing view of Nasser} was shown in his personalised attacks on the man he increasingly identified as a potential fascist of the Middle East to rival those of Europe whose appeasement he, Eden, had opposed in 1938"(51).
The language that Woodward uses reflects his position towards Nasser, whom he writes about objectively. For example, he describes the Israelis as "hawks {who} had been looking for an opportunity to strike at what they identified as a growing potential threat from revolutionary Egypt…"(ibid.). He tries to show where the interests lay - with the French, "the issue was not just the canal but Nasser's promotion of Arab nationalism, in particular, the encouragement he was giving to the nationalist FLN in its growing struggle in Algeria…"(ibid.). Conversely, the British were concerned about how far Nasser's nationalization would serve as a potential frustration of their economic interests in that region.
In the final analysis, Woodward concurs with the many other sources I have consulted that Anglo-Franco-Israeli collusion was a duplicitous act, and most serious of all, it was "self-evident complicity and aggression". (52)
Darwin, John. 'The significance of the Suez crisis. International Politics and the End of Empire', in: The End of the British Empire. The Historical Debate. Blackwell Publishers. Oxford. 1991, 1994.
In my opinion, this particular author, a Fellow of Nuffeld College, Oxford and Beit Lecturer in the History of the British Commonwealth, indicates partiality in his analysis of the Suez Crisis. Perhaps, a brief overview of his book may be necessary to understand the context.
As the title of the book suggests, he writes about the end of the British Empire, arguing whether it came about due to the onslaught of colonial nationalism or other factors, most notably tectonic shifts on the international scene.
Personally, I think he downplays the importance of the Suez Crisis. He may have a point in arguing, like Gorst and Johnman, as well as Woodward, that Suez somewhat reflected the already-weakening position of the empires, rather than helped engender its demise.
This much may be true given that after the Second World War, Britain was no longer as powerful as it was previously, particularly since the United States had helped Europe rebuild itself by donating substantial funds through the Marshall Plan in 1947. That said, it would perhaps be naïve to maintain that this did not necessarily prevent Britain from aspiring to achieve great power status.
Darwin in fact admonishes one to treat assertions that Suez played a "decisive part in puncturing British 'illusions' about their ability to remain an independent great power…"(70) with subtlety, because he believes for three reasons that its significance is of negligible value.
He argues that in the first instance, British leaders had not been conducting foreign policy "in the spirit of the Titanic cruising at full speed"(ibid.) but rather, since 1945, the British government had acknowledged the United States' as an increasingly powerful factor in international affairs.
His second point, he argues to be an acceptance and recognition that Britain "had put in hand well before Suez the arrangements of the independence of Ghana and Malaya… and the acceleration of Nigeria and other colonial territories in Africa…towards full or fuller self-government…"(70).
As for the final one, he contends that the fiasco at Suez did not inhibit Britain's "appetite for far-flung defence commitments or small colonial wars."(ibid.). This is exemplified in the way Britain was committed to arranging with Malaysia post-Suez.
So convinced is Darwin that Suez's significance is inconsequential that he goes as far as arguing that it only served to aid and make an impact on British decisions in the Far East. However, what is perhaps the most striking and compelling interpretation is the one he advances regarding the Russians: "in many ways the most sinister aspect of the Suez crisis had been the readiness of the Soviet Union to challenge British primacy in the Middle East…"(72).
This latter argument to me smacks of the Russophobia that the Crimean War of 1853-56 generated. I suspect that this idea of casting aspersion on the Russians is perhaps a way of deflecting the perfidy of Britain, as well as another way of possibly reviving the historical animosity that was inherent between Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century after Crimea.
Whilst his point arguably may be a plausible one, it ultimately remains specious. Nothing can mask the fact that ultimately, an unprecedented collusion between reasonably great powers took place in order to secure their respective interests, and that it was the world's emerging superpower --the United States - as well as Russia and the United Nations that brought them drastically to heel.
Published on 28 June 2003 by RISQ
© E.K. Bensah | www.risq.org
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