This article outlines the rationale behind suicide terrorism. Contrary to being deranged or crazy, many suicide terrorists have above average education and come from middle class families. In fact, most are normal and sane.[1] So whilst denigrating them as lunatics or ‘cowards’[2] might be viscerally satisfying, it does little to broaden our understanding of the phenomena and thus handicaps our ability to deal with the problem.

The boldest form of asymmetric warfare, suicide terrorism represents ‘value for money’. It is cheap, brutally efficient, and difficult to stop, making it an attractive option when compared to more traditional terrorist tactics (e.g. car bombings, assassinations, etc). Indeed, the decision to deploy suicide terrorists results from a crude cost-benefit analysis. The group will consider the impact in employing suicide terrorism on its profile. Will it incur heavier casualties on its enemy? Is the overall benefit (or cost) greater than a conventional attack? Does the attack mobilise public support for the group’s activities? Thus, rather than the act of a lone or crazy individuals, we see that suicide terrorism is a corporate effort from the recruitment and training of the bomber, to the intelligence gathering on the target, and getting the suicide bombers to their final destination. These chilling advantages form the core rationale for terror groups to use the tactic. Some of these are outlined below.

Suicide attacks often cause heavy casualties and extensive damage. From 1980 to 2001, suicide attacks worldwide represented only 3% of all terrorist attacks whilst accounting for 48% of the total deaths due to terrorism.[3] In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict specifically, attacks carried out between 2000 and 2002 caused about 44% of all Israeli casualties, despite only representing 1% of the total number of attacks during the period.[4] From 1993 to 2003, over 300 Palestinian suicide attackers have struck Israeli targets, with suicide terror representing a significant portion of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad attacks, 43% respectively.[5] Underscoring its importance, former Hamas leader Abd al-Aziz Rantisi of Hamas described the attacks as the most important ‘strategic weapon’ of the Palestinian resistance.[6]

The ongoing insurgency in Iraq has seen the number of suicide attacks rocket with bloody consequences. These occur almost on a daily basis and have driven the death toll up considerably, most notably amongst Iraqi civilians. For example, at the end of July of this year, 68 people were killed when a suicide bomb exploded outside a police station. In March of 2004, during the Shia Ashour festival, 261 pilgrims were killed at Baghdad and Karabala, making it the bloodiest day since the fall of Saddam Hussein.

Unstoppable

Significant resources have been devoted to countering suicide terror attacks in recent years with varying results. The violent eruption of the second Intifada in 2000 and the Palestinians embracing of suicide bombings has seen a tough Israeli response with seemingly successful albeit controversial results. It remains to be seen whether Israel’s ‘targeted assassination’ of militant leaders, which has also led to the deaths of a large number of civilians, offers any long-term solution to Israel’s security problems. Rather, Israel’s heavy-handedness may be inculcating another generation of would-be suicide bombers. In this sense, Thomas Friedman notes that “Palestinians have adopted suicide bombing as a strategic choice, not out of desperation”.[7]

For the Palestinians, suicide attack offers a significant tactical advantage over conventional terrorist tactics given the numerical and technological superiority of Israel. It ensures that the attack will be carried out at the most appropriate time with a view to maximising  casualties. Similarly, it is extremely difficult to counter suicide attacks once the terrorist is at the target. Even if the terrorist is apprehended, the explosive device can still be detonated. From an operational perspective, suicide terrorism is appealing, as the terrorist organisation doesn’t have to plan an escape route, which is often the most complicated part of  a mission. Further, the resultant media saturation instills a sense of extreme vulnerability and helplessness on behalf of the target population, popularising the myth that the suicide bomber is somehow invincible and unstoppable.

‘Value for money’

Suicide attacks are cheap as the ingredients are common and widely available.   At the same time, they are more likely to inflict higher casualties than convention methods. The average cost of a Hamas attack inside Israel is estimated to cost around $150.[8] In Bali, over two hundred tourists died at the hands of two bombers, whilst on September 11 nearly three thousand died at the hands of just 19 hijackers.

Apart from the thousands killed on September 11, a feat unlikely to have been achieved by other means, the cost economically was enormous, with an estimated $100 billion wiped from US GDP.[9] When the holiday island of Bali was struck, the bombs were made from widely accessible ingredients: black powder, potassium chloride and TNT.

Legitimacy and recruitment

Terrorist organisations  benefit from the death of a member, conferring a sense of legitimacy. The message is one of no going back. The group glorifying the act, infusing a culture of martyrdom that may include posters, songs and flyers.  It  inspires others to join its ranks. Indeed even before the bomber has struck, they are in many ways a living martyr. The rituals in which the prospective attacker typically engages are designed to make it virtually impossible to back out of an attack without losing honour and a place in society. Merari explains: “There is no return for him without really losing any self-respect, the respect of others, but also because his mental state is already focused on killing himself, on being dead.”[10] In the event of capture, would-be suicide bombers often face the ignominy as ‘half-martyrs’ and may consider themselves as good as dead. 

Amongst Palestinian children, there has been an increased tendency to idolise suicide bombers. A recent report cited 25% of Palestinian boys between the ages of 12-17 wanted to become suicide bombers.[11] Dr Eyad Serraj, a psychiatrist in the Gaza Strip, claims that in  children’s minds, the life of a martyr is one of power and glory. “Palestinian society glorifies the martyr. They are elevated to the levels of saints and even prophets. Out of the hopelessness and the inhuman environment they live in, there is the promise that they will have a better life in heaven.”[12]

The ensuing retaliation that follows a suicide bombing also benefits the terrorist organisation as it further increases people’s sense of victimisation and readiness to behave according to the doctrines and policies of the organisation. This radicalisation of opinion increases both supply and demand for martyrdom operations.

Outbidding and market share

In cases where multiple organisations are competing for public support by outbidding one another, the decision to deploy martyrs reflects the organisations’ competition for market share.[13] Mia Bloom argues that during the deadlock in the peace process in 1996-99 when Palestinian public support for martyrdom operations rose, Hamas and Islamic Jihad sought to increase such attacks to augment their profiles at the expense of the PA.[14] Martyrdom operations are so ubiquitous that they have become bases of mobilisation for the organisations that employ it. Since the second Intifada (September 2000-), the number of organisations using the tactic has proliferated. New groups, as well as older groups, who previously eschewed the tactic, have become the norm. Secular organisations, the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), the DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine), al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (linked to the secular Fatah organisation) are now competing with the Islamists to capture the Palestinian imagination. For example, the PFLP under the leadership of George Habash had always repudiated suicide terror and refused to engage in it. Seeing its influence declining because it was not as bold as the Islamists groups, the group adopted the language of jihad, using Qur’anic verses, making religious an organisation that was founded on Marxist principles. After engaging in suicide bombings, the PFLP saw an increase in new recruits and funding. Similarly, the organisations popularity has increased, though nowhere near the levels of Hamas, which commands around 30-40%, support amongst Palestinians.

We have seen many instances of groups attempting to outbid each other when it has come to claiming responsibility for attacks. The New York Times cites “Several Palestinians groups rushed forward to claim responsibility for the bus bombing- an indication of the competition among Palestinians for militant credibility”.[15] This incident saw at least four organisations separately claim responsibility for the attacks, demonstrative of the competitive nature of the ‘martyrdom business’. Human Rights Watch reported the ascension of suicide bombings by the al Aqsa Brigade as attributable to Fatah’s fears that it was losing political ground to the Islamists. “When the al Aqsa Brigades started [martyrdom operations], it was the decisions of all districts….the political leaders feared they would lose their influence in the street”.[16]

The role of women

Increasingly, more women are doing undertaking suicide missions. This is increasingly evident in the conflict in Chechnya. The LTTE, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party and the Kurdish PKK (People Workers Party) and various Islamist strands have employed women in martyrdom operations. The Palestinian Islamist group, Hamas, first employed a female suicide bomber in 2001 some 7 years after it began suicide bombings.[17] Former leader, Abd al-Rantisi claimed ‘there is no reason that the perpetration of suicide attacks should be monopolised by men’.[18] It is also possible to regard this as a pragmatic decision on the part of Hamas  in light of the effectiveness of the Israeli security forces in identifying suicide bombers.  The popularity of using women in martyrdom operations can be explained by ‘the gentle sex’ attracting less suspicion than men do. Furthermore, there is reluctance in conservative societies to  search women physically.

Women have participated in about 30-40% of the LTTE’s overall suicide activities. LTTE ‘luminaries’ include a female suicide bomber who killed Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and another, who wounded the Sri Lankan president in 1999. Of the fourteen suicide attacks claimed by the Kurdish PKK, eleven have been undertaken by women.[19] The Chechen conflict has seen the proliferation of female suicide bombers. Consider the following trail of death. In June 2003 a Chechen female suicide bomber blew herself up on a bus carrying Russian troops to Chechnya, killing 16 soldiers.[20] In July 2003, an attack by two female suicide bombers killed fifteen at an outdoor rock concern in Moscow. Then again six were killed in a similar attack outside the Kremlin in December. The onslaught has continued in 2004 with 39 being killed when a suicide bomber struck the Moscow metro. In the last two weeks alone, female suicide bombers struck the Moscow Metro again, killing ten people, while two domestic airlines were brought down a week later killing 90.

More recently, the United States has issued several security alerts fearing al Qa’ida may be recruiting female suicide bombers to target the US mainland. [21]  This reflects al Qa’ida’s efforts to evade the prying eyes of the intelligence agencies. This also comes after a Saudi owned newspaper published an email from a woman claiming to be leader of the women mujahedeen of al-Qaeda. She described the women’s role as “besides martyr operations, our mission is to provide logistical support to the mujahedeen and intelligence on the hypocrites wanted by the mujahedeen.”[22] Whether the threat is real unknown,  al-Qai’da’s  (and its sister organisations)  provesitself nimble and adept at responding in innovative ways.

Conclusion

There is a ‘strategic logic’ behind suicide terrorism. The perpetrators are neither crazed nor delusional with suicide terrorism serving a specific and brutal goal according to the terror organisation’s game plan. In order to defeat it, governments must make suicide terrorism less attractive, and by that, make it more ‘expensive’ for terrorist organisations. A comprehensive set of policies needs to be implemented that drain the swamp where suicide terrorism festers by removing, or at least minimising the conditions of conflict and reduces  its appeal amongst the terrorists’ sympathisers.